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I INTRODUCTION
Legislation to protect consumers against unfair contract terms has long been
overdue in South Africa.1 The inclusion of provisions on unfair contract
terms in the new Consumer Protection Act2 should therefore be welcomed.3
However, as this contribution will show, the provisions on unfair contract
terms in the Act are lacking in some respects. The problems faced by
consumers which necessitate legislative protection have not been sufficiently
addressed. Neither has international best practice in the field been properly
* BA LLB LLD (Stell). I am grateful to the Oxford Institute of European and
Comparative Law, particularly its Director, Stefan Vogenauer, for hosting me as a
visiting fellow in Oxford where most of this research was done. I also benefited from
financial assistance by the National Research Foundation, the Harry Crossley Fund
and the International Office of the University of Stellenbosch. Views expressed in
this article should obviously not be attributed to any of these institutions.
1 For a comprehensive discussion of the need for such legislation see Tjakie
Naudé ‘Unfair contract terms legislation: The implications of why we need it for its
formulation and application’ (2006) 17 Stell LR 361. See also already C C Turpin
‘Contract and imposed terms’ (1956) 73 SALJ 144; Peter Aronstam Consumer Protec-
tion, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979); Hein Kötz ‘Controlling unfair contract
terms: Options for legislative reform’ (1986) 103 SALJ 405; C F C van der Walt ‘Die
huidige posisie van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg met betrekking tot onbillike kontraksbe-
dinge’ (1986) 103 SALJ 647; G T S Eiselen ‘Die standaardbedingprobleem: Ekon-
omiese magsmisbruik, verbruikersvraagstuk of probleem in eie reg?’ (1988) 21 De Jure
251, (1989) 22 De Jure 44; C F C van der Walt ‘Kontrakte en beheer oor kontrakvry-
heid in ’n nuwe Suid-Afrika’ (1991) 54 THRHR 367; Jonathan Lewis ‘Fairness in
SouthAfrican contract law’ (2003) 120 SALJ 330.
2 Act 68 of 2008.
3 See Naudé op cit note 1. However, separate detailed legislation geared specifi-
cally to the problem of unfair contract terms, and providing for differentiated levels of
control for business-to-consumer (‘B2C’) and business-to-business (‘B2B’) contracts,
would have been preferable. Note that the provisions on unfair contract terms will
only come into force eighteen months after date of signature by the President, that is,
on 24 October 2010 (s 122 read with item 2 of Schedule 2).
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considered. The Act therefore requires amendment to ensure effective
protection against unfair contract terms.
The provisions on unfair contract terms in the Act will be analysed here in
terms of the three main categories into which legislative control mechanisms in
respect of standard contract terms may typically be divided. The first category are
rules on the incorporation of contract terms, that is, rules that set threshold
requirements for terms to be considered part of the contract in the first place.
Such rules have been termed ‘incorporation tests’ or ‘prerequisites’, but control
on this basis could also be termed ‘incorporation control’.4 Once terms comply
with such preliminary requirements for incorporation, unfair contract terms
legislation typically also provide for overt control of their contents in the form of
a power for courts to strike out unfair contract terms. This form of control is
called ‘content control’ in German literature,5 but the term ‘substantive control’
has also been used elsewhere.6 Once contract terms pass this additional hurdle,
rules on interpretation would cause terms to be interpreted against the party on
whose behalf they were drafted, that is, typically in favour of the consumer and
against the business in a business-to-consumer (‘B2C’) contract. This type of
control could be termed ‘interpretation control.’ In addition, legislation may
prescribe mandatory terms which are implied by law into consumer contracts,
which may of course not be excluded or varied by contrary agreement.
The South African Consumer Protection Act makes use of all these
techniques. Non-derogable rights are created for consumers and small
businesses throughout the Act, for example, the consumer’s right to quality
goods which are enforceable by remedies of repair, replacement or refund.7
In addition, s 4(4)(a) gives statutory authority to the contra proferentem
rule of interpretation. Any contract or document must therefore be inter-
preted ‘to the benefit of the consumer so that any ambiguity that allows for
more than one reasonable interpretation of a part of such a document is
resolved to the benefit of the consumer’. Confusingly, s 4 also provides that
‘[t]he [National Consumer] Tribunal or court must interpret any standard form,
contract or other document prepared or published by or on behalf of a supplier
. . . to the benefit of the consumer . . . (b) so that any restriction, limitation,
exclusion or deprivation of a consumer’s legal rights set out in such a document
or notice is limited to the extent that a reasonable person would ordinarily
contemplate or expect, having regard to (i) the content of the document; (ii)
the manner and form in which the document was prepared and presented; and
(iii) the circumstances of the transaction or agreement.’8
4 See the separate discussion of ‘incorporation tests’ under the topic ‘Unfair
Clauses’ in Hugh Beale et al Cases, Materials and Texts on Contract Law (2002) 496. See
also Peter Ulmer ‘§ 305’ in Peter Ulmer AGB-Recht — Kommentar zu den §§ 305-310
BGB und zum Unterlassungsklagengesetz 10 ed (2006) 211 (Rn 123).
5 ‘Inhaltskontrolle.’See, for example,Andreas Fuchs ‘Vorbemerkung zum Inhalts-
kontrolle’ in Ulmer et al op cit note 4 at 492.
6 Beale et al op cit note 4 at 509.
7 Sections 55 and 56.
8 Section 4(4)(b).
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Although this form of control purports to be by interpretation, it
effectively allows the Tribunal or court to deviate completely from a strict
interpretation by simply ignoring plainly worded limitations on a consumer’s
rights where such limitations are not reasonably foreseeable in view of the
surrounding circumstances. In other words, under s 4(4)(b) the Tribunal or
court may give a meaning to a term which on normal or strict interpretation
it cannot have. This provision is unnecessary as Chapter 2 Part G of the Act
on unfair contract terms (ss 48 and 52) already allows a court to strike out
unfair contract terms. When a court finds that a contract term restricts a
consumer’s rights more than a ‘reasonable person would ordinarily expect’, it
should either hold that the term is surprising and should therefore have been
specifically pointed out to the consumer before it binds her under the
common law rules on mistake9 or should otherwise openly strike out or
amend the term on the basis that it is unfair under s 48. A court should not
pretend that it is merely interpreting the contract when it is simply ignoring
or amending a term beyond what the words can possibly mean. Section
4(4)(b) should therefore be deleted.
Chapter 2 Part G of the Act provides for incorporation and content
control under the heading ‘Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and
conditions’. However, the provisions are not structured logically along these
lines as is the case with international examples of unfair contract terms
legislation which do contain incorporation requirements.10 Section 48
contains the general prohibition against unfair terms, which therefore
amounts to content control. However, s 49 then purports to set formal
requirements for incorporation of certain types of terms, such as a require-
ment that certain types of terms must be signed or initialed or the consumer
must have otherwise acted in a manner consistent with acknowledgment of
such terms.11 Thereafter s 50 provides for written contracts to be in plain
language etc, after which s 51 returns to the theme of content control by
providing a list of prohibited terms. Finally, s 52 bestows powers on courts in
cases involving unfair contract terms. Confusingly, s 52 also grants powers to
courts in respect of unconscionable conduct (prohibited in s 40, in the
previous Part of Chapter 2) and misrepresentations (prohibited in s 41), and
in respect of contravention of the incorporation requirements of s 49 as well.
The next part of this contribution will focus firstly on the incorporation
control of s 49. Thereafter, s 50 will be discussed, as it blends elements of
incorporation control and content control. Next, ss 48 and 51 which provide
9 If a term is surprising and was not pointed out to the consumer, there is no
consensus on the term and no reasonable reliance on consensus on the part of the
consumer. See, for example, Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005
(4) SA345 (SCA); Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA572 (SCA).
10 For example, the German Civil Code’s provisions on standard contract terms
start off with requirements for the incorporation of standard terms (§§ 305-306 BGB)
and thereafter provide for content control (§§307-309 BGB).
11 Section 49(2).
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for content control will be discussed. Finally, s 52 on the court’s powers in
respect of prohibited conduct will be considered.
II INCORPORATION PREREQUISITES: SECTION 49
Section 49 provides that certain types of terms or notices must be drawn to
the attention of the consumer in a prescribed manner and form. This
discussion will focus on contract terms, but the same applies mutatis mutandis
to notices of similar effect.
The four types of terms in question are, first, exemption clauses (that is,
clauses limiting in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or another
person), secondly, clauses by which the consumer assumes a risk or liability,
thirdly, indemnity clauses (requiring the consumer to indemnify the supplier
or any other person for any cause), and finally, acknowledgments of any fact
by the consumer.12
First, these types of terms must be written in plain language.13 Secondly,
their existence, nature and effect must be drawn to the attention of the
consumer in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the
attention of an ordinarily alert consumer.14 This must be done before the
earlier time at which the consumer enters into the transaction or engages in
the activity or enters the facility to which the term relates, or is required or
expected to offer ‘consideration’ (counter-performance) for the transac-
tion.15 Thirdly, the consumer must be given an adequate opportunity to
receive and comprehend the term.16
It is unclear what format would be regarded as sufficiently conspicuous to
be ‘likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer.’ It is
submitted that it should generally not be sufficient for the exemption clauses
etc to be printed on the reverse side of the contractual document, even if that
is done in a contrasting color or font. Most consumers do not even turn over
contract forms to glance at the standard terms on the reverse, given the time
and effort it would take to read the terms, try to understand their
implications, find someone in the organization with authority to negotiate
about them or shop around for better standard terms.17 The high ‘transaction
costs’ of doing all of this and the implicit understanding that the terms are
invariable and presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis put most consumers off
from doing more than checking the primary terms as to price and definition
of the main subject matter before signing the document.18 If the exemption
clause etc is printed in contrasting typeface close to the primary terms of the
12 Section 49(1).
13 Section 49(3) read with s 22.
14 Section 49(1) read with s 49(4).
15 Section 49(4).
16 Section 49(5).
17 See Naudé op cit note 1 at 366-7.
18 Ibid.
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contract, and must therefore be noticed by any consumer who reads the
primary terms, this may be sufficient.
What is clear from s 49 is that it is not sufficient to bring the four types of
terms in question to the notice of the consumer after conclusion of the
agreement, or after the consumer begins to engage in the activity, enters or
gains access to the facility or is expected or required to offer counter-
performance for the goods or services to be provided. This means, for
example, that adventure sports companies can no longer book an adventure
holiday for the consumer over the phone, receive payment in respect
thereof, and only confront the consumer with the requirement to sign an
exemption clause once the consumer arrives at the destination.
In addition, s 49 provides that provisions or notices concerning activities
or facilities that are subject to certain types of risks must also be drawn to the
attention of the consumer in the same manner. The risks in question are
defined as any risk:
‘(a) of an unusual character or nature;
(b) the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be expected to
be aware or notice, or which an ordinarily alert consumer could not
reasonably be expected to notice or contemplate in the circumstances; or
(c) that could result in serious injury or death.’19
Provisions relating to such risks must also be signed or initialed by the
consumer, unless the consumer had otherwise assented to that provision ‘by
acting in a manner consistent with acknowledgment of the notice, awareness
of the risk and acceptance of the provision.’20
Section 49 does not spell out the consequences of non-compliance with its
requirements. For this one has to consider s 52 on the powers of a court to
ensure fair terms. Section 52(4) provides that if a term or notice failed to
satisfy the requirements of s 49, the court may make an order severing the
provision or notice from the agreement, or declaring it to have no force or
effect with respect to the transaction. The court may also make any further
order that is just and reasonable in the circumstances.21 It therefore seems that
non-compliance with s 49 will have no extra-judicial effect such as rendering
the terms in question voidable at the instance of the consumer, although this
is not completely clear. To require that a court must pronounce the term as
having no force or effect is to ignore the severe limitations of judicial control
in the consumer context, particularly in view of the cost, risk and effort of
litigation to consumers.22 Section 49 should rather have provided that a
supplier who did not comply with s 49 may not rely on the contract term in
question. In that case, the consumer would only need to approach a court in




22 See Naudé op cit note 1 for a full discussion of these limitations.
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Although aspects of s 49 are to be welcomed, incorporation prerequisites
that specific types of terms be specifically drawn to the attention of the
consumer and counter-signed or initialed can be a double-edged sword
which may ultimately work against the consumer.23 The apparent legislative
condonation of such clauses, provided they are signed or initialed, may
strengthen the hand of the supplier to argue that they are always fair.24 This is
particularly worrying in respect of clauses excluding or limiting liability for
bodily injury or death caused negligently. Section 49(2) seems to provide
legislative sanction for exemption clauses excluding or limiting liability for
personal injury or death caused negligently, as long as they are signed or
initialed by the consumer. For various reasons, such clauses would in fact
mostly be unfair, regardless of whether the consumer knew about them at the
time of conclusion of the contract and signed next to them. Ultimately, they
involve the consumer’s fundamental rights to bodily integrity and life.25 Such
exemption clauses may also have been sprung on the consumer at the very
last minute, when the decision to contract had already been taken and all
kinds of arrangements made in expectation of conclusion of the contract.
The decision in Afrox Healthcare v Strydom26 provides an example of a clause
that is unfair for this reason (amongst others). As has already been pointed
out, when the patient signs the admission form exempting the private
hospital from liability for bodily injury or death caused by their employees’
negligence, he has already made all sorts of arrangements for leave at work, is
likely to have already arranged treatment by a specific doctor who only
operates from that particular hospital, and may have a strong interest in
immediately proceeding with the hospitalization as planned in view of his
medical condition.27 To pull out of all these arrangements at the very last
moment when confronted with the exemption clause, in order to seek better
contract terms elsewhere, is not a realistic option and the consumer will sign
anyway.28 In this sense the consumer’s bargaining power is fatally impaired
and the supplier takes unconscionable advantage of the situation by including
the exemption clause. The structural inequality caused by this situation, the
fact that the term is contrary to the main purpose of an agreement for the
provision of medical care, and that it ultimately involves the patient’s
fundamental right to life and bodily integrity, means that the clause should
usually be substantively unfair, regardless of whether the consumer knew
23 As already pointed out by Naudé op cit note 1 at 378.
24 Ewoud Hondius Standaardvoorwaarden (1978) 577; cf Robert A Hillman ‘Online
boilerplate: Would mandatory website disclosure of e-standard terms backfire?’
(2006) 105 Michigan LR 837 at 840, 854; William C Whitford ‘Contract law and the
control of standardized terms in consumer contracts: An American report’ (1995) 3
European Review of Private Law 193 at 206.
25 Sections 11 and 12(2) of the Bill of Rights.
26 2002 (6) SA21 (SCA).
27 Tjakie Naudé & Gerhard Lubbe ‘Exemption clauses — A rethink occasioned by
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA21 (SCA)’ (2005) 122 SALJ 441 at 461.
28 Naudé & Lubbe op cit note 27 at 461.
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about it or could theoretically have found better standard terms elsewhere in
the market.29 In addition, consumers are not able to guard against the
supplier’s negligence and will often not be insured against bodily injury or
death caused by the supplier’s negligence.30
Exemption clauses relating to bodily injury or death are therefore mostly
held to be unfair per se in Europe. They are prohibited outright in some
countries’ legislation.31 The EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts of 1993 (which does not have a so-called ‘black list’ of prohibited
clauses) requires that, at the least, exemption clauses in respect of ‘injury or
death caused by an act or omission of the supplier’ be greylisted throughout
the European Union.32 This means that such terms must at the very least be
included in an indicative list of clauses which may be regarded as unfair,
whereas the supplier may still persuade a court otherwise.33
Counter-signing requirements in the Italian unfair terms legislation have
proved to be of dubious value to consumers for the above-mentioned reasons
and because they just become another formality which does not necessarily
ensure that the consumer even reads the terms that he initials.34 Subsequent
legislation in other countries has wisely tended to avoid this type of
incorporation control. Instead, more general requirements that the consumer
must have been given an opportunity to take note of the contract terms are
used.35 Some legislation also provides more generally that surprising or
unusual terms do not form part of the contract unless they have been
specifically assented to.36 The South African common law already implicitly
29 Cf Naudé & Lubbe op cit note 27 at 461.
30 Ibid.
31 Prohibited in s 2(1) of the United Kingdom’s Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977,
and also in s 1(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Bill drafted by the Law Commissions
of England, Wales and Scotland (Law Commission of England and Wales and the
Scottish Law Commission Unfair Terms in Contracts — Report on a Reference Under
s 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 292, Scot Law Com No 199)
(2005) (hereafter English and Scottish Law Commission Report; § 309(7)(a) BGB
(German Civil Code); § 6(1)(a) Austrian Consumer Protection Act (Konsumenten-
schutzgesetz); art 18(a) of the Portuguese Decree-Law No 446/85 of 25 October
1985 on unfair contract terms, as amended by Decree-Law No 220/95 of 31 January
1995.
32 EC Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 93/13/EEC of 5 April
1993. As a minimum harmonization directive, it prescribes merely a minimum level
of protection. See on the status of the Directive’s indicative list of clauses that may be
regarded as unfair, art 3(3) and the Recital as well as Commission of the European
Communities v Sweden Case C-478/99; [2002] ECR I-4147 para 11. The EC’s Pro-
posal for a new Directive on Consumer Rights prohibits such clauses outright
(Annexure II of Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights COM(2008) 614 final;
2008/0196 (COD)).
33 Item (a) of Schedule 1 to the Directive.
34 Hondius op cit note 24 at 577 with reference to art 1341 of the Italian Civil
Code; cf also Hillman op cit note 24 at 840, 854; Whitford op cit note 24 at 206.
35 See, for example, art 6:233(b) of the Dutch Civil Code and § 305 of the German
Civil Code.
36 For example, § 305c of the German Civil Code.
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recognizes such a principle.37 This type of rule on surprising terms is more
preferable than express counter-signing requirements.
The counter-signing requirement of s 49 is particularly problematic if
courts do not sufficiently grasp that substantive unfairness on its own should
often be sufficient reason for setting aside a term, regardless of procedural
aspects such as the particular individual consumer’s knowledge of the term as
evidenced by signature. As will be shown further below, in some respects the
Act focuses more on procedural unfairness than on substantive unfairness and
does not sufficiently take into account the typical problems faced by
consumers when confronted with standard contract terms.
III SECTION 50 ON WRITTEN CONSUMER AGREEMENTS: A
MIXTURE OF INCORPORATION AND CONTENT CON-
TROL
Section 50 provides, first, that the Minister may prescribe categories of
consumer agreements that are required to be in writing.38 Secondly, any
written consumer agreement must comply with certain requirements. Most
importantly, any written agreement must satisfy the requirements of s 22 as to
plain and understandable language.39 The consumer is given a right to a free
copy of such agreement or free electronic access to a copy, which must
furthermore set out an itemized breakdown of the consumer’s financial
obligations under the agreement.40 In addition, s 50 provides that if a
consumer agreement is in writing, it applies irrespective of whether the
consumer has signed the agreement.41 Lastly, if a consumer agreement is not
in writing, the supplier ‘must keep a record of transactions entered into over
the telephone or any other recordable form as prescribed’.42
The Act does not spell out the consequences of non-compliance with s 50.
The general point of departure under South African law is that non-
compliance with statutory formalities results in the nullity of the transac-
tion.43 However, the legislation in question may provide otherwise. For
example, the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, which required credit
agreements to be in writing, specifically provided that the mere fact that an
agreement is not in writing and signed by the parties does not mean that it is
invalid. The absence of a similar provision in the Consumer Protection Act
may point to the conclusion that the general rule should apply, namely that
37 Constantia Insurance Co v Compusource supra note 9 confirms that an adhering
party would not be bound by a contract term to which it did not and could not
reasonably have been thought to agree. The fact that the clause was unusual played a






43 Schalk van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 3 ed (2007) 172 and cases
there cited.
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the transaction or a particular term is invalid if it does not comply with the
writing, recording or plain-language requirements. However, two provi-
sions in the Act seem to contradict or qualify this conclusion. First, as noted,
s 50 itself provides that if a consumer agreement is in writing it applies
irrespective of whether the consumer has signed the agreement. This means
that writing may be an incorporation requirement, but not signature.
Secondly, s 52 implies that non-compliance with the requirement of plain
and understandable language does not render the agreement void per se.
‘[T]he extent to which any documents relating to the transaction or
agreement satisfied the requirements of s 22 [on plain and understandable
language]’ is merely listed in s 52 as one of the factors which the court must
consider to decide whether a contract term is unfair, unreasonable or unjust
under s 48.44
In European legislation on unfair contract terms, the fact that a provision is
not clear and comprehensible is also usually not an absolute bar to its
incorporation per se, but rather a factor to be taken into account when
deciding whether it should be struck out of the contract as unfair. For
example, the general clause of the German Civil Code provides that
‘[p]rovisions in standard business terms are ineffective if, contrary to the
requirement of good faith, they unreasonably disadvantage the other party to
the contract’.45 It then provides that ‘an unreasonable disadvantage may also
result from the fact that the provision is not clear and comprehensible’. The
Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the English and Scottish Law
Commissions also provides that
‘whether a contract term is fair and reasonable is to be determined by taking
into account (a) the extent to which the term is transparent and (b) the
substance and effect of the term and all the circumstances at the time it was
agreed.’46
‘Transparent’ is then defined as
‘(a) expressed in reasonably plain language, (b) legible, (c) presented clearly, and
(d) readily available to any person likely to be affected by the contract term or
notice in question.’47
Although the EC Unfair Terms Directive does not contain a similar
explicit provision, it is implicit from art 4(1) that the language in which a
term is couched is a relevant factor in assessing fairness. Article 4(1) excludes
‘core terms’ from review, but only in so far as these terms are in plain and
44 Section 52(2)(g).
45 § 307 BGB (translations throughout from the German Justice Ministry’s website
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000G27
(last accessed 13 March 2009)).
46 Section 14(1). See also s 14(2) which has a similar provision on notices.
47 Section 14(3).
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intelligible language. Therefore obscurity of language can lead to core terms
being declared unfair.48
However, under all these rules courts would probably easily strike out a
term as unfair merely because it is not transparent.
It remains to comment on the provision in s 50(2)(a) that if the agreement
is in writing it applies irrespective of whether or not the consumer has signed
it. This must mean that the supplier wishing to rely on the contract would
still have to prove that agreement was reached on all the provisions set out in
writing. The consumer would still be able to dispute having agreed to all the
terms where she did not sign the document. This paragraph should ideally be
reworded to state that if the agreement is in writing the consumer may rely
on it irrespective of whether or not the consumer has signed it. That would
mean that the paragraph would only operate to the benefit of the consumer,
and there would be no chance of the supplier relying on an unsigned
document on the basis of this paragraph alone where the consumer disputes
having actually agreed to all the terms in the written document.
IV CONTENT CONTROL: SECTIONS 48, 51 AND 52
Sections 48, 51 and 52 provide for control of the contents of terms which
otherwise comply with requirements for incorporation into the contract.
Section 48 prohibits the use of unfair terms, whereas s 52 grants courts the
power to strike out unfair terms, as well as certain additional powers. Section
51 contains a list of prohibited clauses which are void per se.
Section 48: The general prohibition against unfair terms
Section 48, headed ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms’, sets out
the general prohibition against unfair, unreasonable or unjust terms and also
purports to provide definitions of the concepts ‘unfair, unreasonable or
unjust’.
Section 48 attempts to cover every possible base by not only prohibiting
the inclusion of unfair terms in agreements, but also prohibits the supplier
from offering to supply goods or services on terms that are unfair, unreason-
able or unjust, or from requiring ‘a consumer or other person to whom any
goods or services are supplied at the direction of the consumer to waive any
rights, assume any obligations or waive any liability of the supplier on terms
that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust.’ 49
Section 48 therefore aims to provide for control of the content of contract
terms, whether already incorporated into a specific transaction or merely put
on offer for general use by the supplier. When read with s 4, this seems to
48 Article 4(1) provides that ‘[a]ssessment of the unfair nature of the terms shall
relate neither to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract nor to the
adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as against the services or
goods supplies in exchange, on the other, in so far as these terms are in plain intelli-
gible language.’
49 Section 48(1)(a) and (c).
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allow an institution with locus standi under s 4, such as a consumer
organization, to seek relief against a mere offer of unfair terms to consumers
generally, without having to involve an individual consumer in the litigation,
as the mere ‘offer’ of unfair terms to consumers constitutes prohibited
conduct under the Act.50 However, as will be seen further below,51 s 52,
which lists the orders that a court may make to ensure fair terms, is written
with only the paradigm of a challenge to an existing agreement between the
supplier and a particular individual consumer in mind, and is not sufficiently
geared towards such ‘abstract’ or ‘general use’ challenges by consumer
organizations. In addition, the list of relevant factors to which courts ‘must’
have regard to when assessing unfairness according to s 52 focuses largely on
the circumstances under which an individual consumer concluded the
particular contract (so-called procedural unfairness factors) and does not give
much guidance as to relevant factors to assess the ‘substantive fairness’ of a
term, which would be more important in such ‘abstract’ or ‘general use
challenges’ by a consumer organization.52
That s 48 is aimed at content control is supported by the heading of this
section (‘Unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms’) and of Part G in
which it is situated (‘Right to fair, just and reasonable terms and conditions’).
However, this conclusion is contradicted by s 48(1)(b), which provides that
the supplier must also not market, negotiate or administer a transaction or
agreement in a manner that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust.53 This speaks to
the process of marketing etc rather than to the actual content of terms proposed
for an agreement or agreed to in fact. Other parts of the Act, such as Part F on
the ‘right to fair and honest dealing’, already regulate the manner of ‘unfair
marketing’ etc. Thus, s 40 on ‘unconscionable conduct’ is already a ‘catch all
clause’ designed to cover any form of unfair conduct. It provides, amongst
other things, that a supplier may not use unfair tactics or any other similar
conduct in connection with any marketing or supply of goods or services, or
in connection with any negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement
of an agreement.54 It is unnecessary and confusing to create a similar general
provision on conduct in s 48 amongst the provisions on the content of
contract terms.
Section 48(2) returns to the theme of content control by purporting to
provide more guidance as to the meaning of ‘unfair, unreasonable or unjust’
50 Section 4(1) provides a list of persons who ‘may, in the manner provided for in
thisAct, approach a court, the Tribunal or the Commission alleging that a consumer’s
rights in terms of this Act have been infringed. . .or that prohibited conduct has
occurred or is occurring.’This list includes a ‘a person acting as a member of, or in the
interest of, a group or class of affected persons; a person acting in the public interest,
with leave of the Tribunal or court, as the case may be; and an association acting in the
interest of its members’.
51 At note 110 to note 118 below.
52 See at note 127 below.
53 My emphasis.
54 See also s 4(5).
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in four paragraphs.55 In fact only the first two relate to control of the contents
of terms. They provide that, without limiting the generality of the general
prohibition against unfair terms, a term or notice is unfair if ‘(a) it is
excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or
other person to whom goods or services are to be supplied;’ or ‘(b) the terms
of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to be
inequitable.’56 Whereas the first of these paragraphs is helpful to flesh out the
concept of unfairness, paragraph (b) is not very useful as ‘inequitable’ is
merely a synonym for ‘unfair.’
It may be useful for courts to consider formulations of the concept of
‘unfairness’ in other legal systems. The Consumer Protection Act itself
provides that courts etc may consider appropriate foreign and international
law when interpreting or applying the Act.57 The Unfair Terms Directive’s
test appears from its general clause which provides that a contractual term is
unfair if, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to
the detriment of the consumer.’58 This test is similar to that in the German
Civil Code, although the latter refers to an unreasonable disadvantage rather
than a significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and duties.59 It has
also inspired a comparable test in the European Draft Common Frame of
Reference of February 2009 (which seeks to serve as a model for a possible
harmonized European Law of Contract), although the standard of ‘fair
dealing’ is added to the concept of ‘good faith’ in this instrument.60 The
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill of 2009
proposes that a term is unfair if ‘(a) it would cause a significant imbalance in
the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract; and (b) it is not
reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party
who would be advantaged by it.’61 This test is based on the Directive’s test,62
but it should be noted that the reference to good faith has been omitted and
the legitimate interests criterion has been added.
55 Section 48(2)(a)–(d).
56 Section 48(2)(a) and (b).
57 Section 2(2)(a).
58 This Directive has largely been copied out in the UK’s Unfair Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts Regulations, 1999 (the first version was promulgated in 1994).
59 § 307 BGB, quoted at note 45 above. See also the Brazilian Consumer Protec-
tion Code: ‘that place the consumer at an unreasonable disadvantage or that are
incompatible with good faith or fair practices’ (s 51.IV of the Código de Defesa do
Consumidor Lei n˚ 8.078 de 11 de setembro de 1990, as translated by David B Jaffe &
Robert G Vaughan South American Consumer Protection Laws (1996) 117).
60 Article II — 9:403 refers to non-negotiated terms that ‘significantly disadvan-
tage the consumer, contrary to good faith and fair dealing.’ The European Commis-
sion’s Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights merely replicates the test of the
Unfair Terms Directive, however (art 32(1)).
61 Section 3(1).
62 As used in s 32W the Fair TradingAct, 1990 of Victoria,Australia.
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The general clause in the German Civil Code also lists two circumstances
in which an unreasonable disadvantage is, in case of doubt, to be assumed.
These are if a provision ‘is not compatible with essential principles of the
statutory provision from which it deviates’ (that is, with the residual rule in
the relevant part of the Code), or ‘limits essential rights or duties inherent in
the nature of the contract to such an extent that attainment of the purpose of
the contract is jeopardized’.63
By contrast to such detailed formulations, the Dutch Civil Code simply
provides that a term is voidable if it is ‘unreasonably detrimental to the
adhering party’.64 Similarly, the general clauses in the United Kingdom’s
Unfair Contract Terms Act are content with simply referring to the
‘requirement of reasonableness’ and then listing a set of relevant factors
elsewhere in the Act.65 The Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the
English and Scottish Law Commissions in 2005 also refers only to ‘fair and
reasonable’ and then lists a set of relevant factors.66 They decided against a
reference to good faith in their test. In this regard, they pointed out that the
majority of the respondents to their Consultation Paper opposed a reference
to good faith, mostly because it may be confusing and is likely to mislead and
because it is a concept which is unfamiliar to UK lawyers in this field.67
Whereas the more detailed formulations of the Directive, German law,
Draft Common Frame of Reference and the proposed Australian legislation
are useful, it is not absolutely essential in my view to provide anything more
than that unfair and unreasonable terms may be struck out, as long as a good
set of relevant factors is supplied (discussed below).68 An explicit reference to
‘good faith’ in the test for unfairness, such as is found in the Directive and
German law, may perhaps mislead South African lay readers of the Act such as
consumer advisors into thinking that terms may only be struck out in
extreme situations of ‘bad faith’. That may lead to too narrow an interpreta-
tion of the prohibition against unfair terms, especially on the part of such lay
readers.69 However, courts should indeed consider the concepts of good faith
and fair dealing in deciding whether a term is unfair, as well as the concept of
63 § 307(2). On the relevance of the second criterion to the legality of a contract
term, and historical and other authority for its use in South African law, see Naudé &
Lubbe op cit note 27. This article was recently cited with approval in Mercurius Motors
v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA) in respect of surprising terms. Although the authors’
argument focused on the relevance of the criterion of the essence or nature of the
contract for common-law control mechanisms, this criterion would be similarly rel-
evant to unfair contract terms legislation.
64 Article 6:233 Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code).
65 See ss 2(2), 3(2) and 4(1) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977. The list of
factors is set out in Schedule 2 to theAct.
66 Section 14 (op cit note 31).
67 English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 31 at 39.
68 At note 132.
69 See also English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 31 at 39.
‘Good faith’ is also omitted from the Australian proposals given the ‘uncertain appli-
cation of that principle in Australian law . . . [and] the potential for differing interpre-
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a ‘significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties’ which is
‘not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the supplier’, as
well as the further presumptions in the German Civil Code.70 In this regard,
good faith must be understood to encompass at least that the pursuit of the
supplier’s own interests ‘must be tempered by a reasonable measure of
concern’ for those of the consumer.71 The consumer’s fundamental right to
dignity in the contractual context encompasses this same standard.72
As stated above, the last two paragraphs of s 48(2), which purport to give
guidance on what is ‘unfair’, do not relate to control of the content of a
contract, but confuse and conflate other forms of control with content
control. Section 48(2)(c) provides that a term is unfair ‘if the consumer relied
on a false, misleading or deceptive misrepresentation, as contemplated in s 41
or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of the supplier, to the
detriment of the consumer.’ Section 41 itself should rather have provided for
the effect of a prohibited misrepresentation, such as that any material
misrepresentation proscribed by that section would render the contract
voidable per se, as under the common law. In addition, s 41 should provide
that an individual term should be voidable if it is severable from the rest of the
contract and consensus on it was improperly obtained because of a misrepre-
sentation. Instead, the implication of s 48(2)(c) in its current form, read with
s 52 on the powers of a court, may be that once a misrepresentation is
proved, a court must first declare a contract or term unfair for the consumer
to obtain any relief, which is a rather convoluted way to achieve protection
against misrepresentations. In any event, at least the common-law rules on
misrepresentation will still enable an extra-judicial avoidance of the contract
or provision.73
Similarly problematic is s 48(2)(d), which provides that the agreement or a
term thereof is unfair if the agreement was subject to a term contemplated in
s 49(1) (exemption clauses etc) and the fact, nature and effect of that term was
not drawn to the attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the
requirements of s 49. Again, it would have been preferable to provide in s 49
itself that if its requirements are not met, the term in question is voidable or
not incorporated into the contract at all. Section 48(2)(d) read with s 52 may
be interpreted to mean that this hurdle of incorporation control does not
have automatic extra-judicial effect, as the result of non-compliance with
s 49 seems to be merely that a court may declare a term unfair and sever it
from the rest of the agreement under s 52. However, courts should preferably
tations of good faith and that other definitions of an unfair term may be equally apt’
(Australian Consumer Law Consultation Paper op cit note 61 at 30).
70 See at note 63 above.
71 This formulation is that of G F Lubbe ‘Bona fides, billikheid en die openbare
belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse kontraktereg’ (1990) 1 Stell LR 1 at 20.
72 Naudé op cit note 1 at 366.
73 Section 2(10) provides that ‘[n]o provision of this Act must be interpreted so as
to preclude a consumer from exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common
law’.
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interpret any prohibition in this part of the Act, including the prohibition of
unfair terms in s 48, as causing such terms to be non-binding on the
consumer per se, with s 52 just enumerating possible court orders that a court
may make in a case where a dispute on the non-binding nature of a term has
reached a court. There are better provisions in other legislation, such as in the
EC Unfair Terms Directive which provides that an unfair term is not binding
on the consumer, and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties if it
is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.74
Section 51: The list of prohibited terms
Section 51 sets out a list of absolutely prohibited terms under the heading
‘Prohibited transactions, agreements, terms or conditions’. Such terms are
void.75 Such lists of prohibited terms are commonly called ‘blacklists’ in
Europe, and this terminology will be used here for brevity’s sake.
The blacklist of s 51 was largely inspired by s 90 of the National Credit Act
on unlawful provisions.76 Subsections (a) and (b) of s 51 of the Consumer
Protection Act are unnecessarily verbose in my view. They aim to prohibit
contractual exclusion or limitation of the consumer’s rights and the supplier’s
obligations under the Act, and could simply have provided that ‘any term or
notice which directly or indirectly waives or restricts the consumer’s rights
under this Act or in any other way contravenes this Act shall be void’. One
example of a mandatory implied term is the right of consumers to claim a
repair, refund or replacement in respect of defective goods77 as well as
damages to the extent provided for in s 61.
Only a few other specific terms are blacklisted in s 5. These are:
(1) exemption clauses in respect of gross negligence;78
(2) transfers of claims by the consumer against the Guardian’s Fund;79
(3) false acknowledgments that no representations were made by the
supplier or that goods or services or a required document were received
by the consumer;80
(4) certain forfeiture clauses;81 and
(5) certain unfair enforcement clauses, such as an undertaking to sign in
advance any documentation relating to enforcement of the agreement,
irrespective of whether such documentation is complete or incomplete
74 Article 6.
75 Section 51(3).
76 Act 34 of 2005. Several of the paragraphs of s 51(1) are directly copied from s 90
of the National CreditAct.
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at the time it is signed, or a requirement that the consumer hands over
his or her bank card and PIN number to the supplier.82
In principle, the decision to include clearer rules in the form of a blacklist
of clauses which would always be unfair is wise. As argued in depth
elsewhere, the limitations of judicial control in the consumer context mean
that clearer rules in the form of black and grey lists of prohibited and
presumptively unfair clauses respectively are essential to ensure fast, real and
effective consumer protection.83 As Stewart Macauly has pointed out,
‘[c]lear rules here might cut the costs of consumers seeking remedies; consum-
ers can seldom afford to battle about reasonableness and unconscionability
when the product in issue cost only a few thousand dollars.’84
To mention but a few advantages of black and grey lists again: they
promote self-imposed control by suppliers themselves, who are far more
likely to react to more specific provisions in a black and grey list as to which
terms are prohibited and which terms must be treated with caution than if
they are merely implored to remove ‘unfair terms’ from their contracts.85
Expensive court action is therefore less likely to be necessary to challenge
unfair terms. Leading writers on unfair terms control therefore regard lists as
‘of crucial importance’86 and ‘the key element of any attempt to regulate
unfair terms.’87
Greylisting typically problematic clauses could have the added benefit that
the burden of convincing a court that a listed term is fair rests on the business
in respect of at least these clauses. This creates an incentive for the business to
bring evidence on the business reasons which justify use of the term in its
particular context, without which it is very difficult for a court properly to
decide on the fairness of a term. The lack of evidence on the business reasons
for the term considered in Napier v Barkhuizen88 appeared to have contrib-
uted to the SCA’s reluctance to strike out the terms as being contrary to
82 Section 51(1)(i) and (j).
83 Tjakie Naudé ‘The use of black and grey lists in unfair contract terms legislation
in comparative perspective’ (2007) 124 SALJ 128.
84 Stewart Macauly ‘The real and the paper deal: Empirical pictures of relation-
ships, complexity and the urge for transparent simple rules’ (2003) 66 Mod LR 44, also
cited in Naudé op cit note 83 at 136.
85 Geraint Howells ‘Good faith in consumer contracting’ in Roger Brownsword,
Norma J Hird & Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context
(1999) 91 at 98; Karl-Heinz Neumayer ‘Contracting subject to standard terms and
conditions’ in Arthur von Mehren (ed) International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law
vol VII chap 12 (1999) 96-7 para 12-96, as also cited by Naudé op cit note 83 at
131-2. For a full exposition of the many other advantages of grey lists, see Naudé op
cit note 83.
86 Ewoud Hondius Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (1987) 183.
87 Giorgio de Nova ‘Italian contract law and the European Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (1995) 3 European Review of Private Law 221 at 230.
88 2006 (4) SA1 (SCA).
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public policy.89 Of course, the consumer is not able to bring such evidence
— it is peculiarly within the knowledge of the business. Greylisting
problematic clauses would place the burden of adducing such evidence
where it belongs.
It is unfortunate that the drafters of the Act did not therefore take account
of experience elsewhere in the world with lists to include a non-exhaustive,
but comprehensive grey list of presumptively unfair clauses in the text of the
legislation as well.90 Many more terms can be greylisted than blacklisted,
whilst this technique still carries the important advantages for proactive and
effective reactive control of lists. Developing countries with not much
experience of unfair contract terms control (such as South Africa) may
justifiably be reluctant immediately to introduce the long lists of prohibited
terms found in some European countries.
At least s 120(1)(d) was included in the final version of the Bill at the
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee’s insistence. This provision allows the
Minister to ‘make regulations relating to unfair, unreasonable or unjust
contract terms.’ This amendment was made in response to a submission to
Parliament that a grey list of presumptively unfair clauses would be essential
for proactive and effective reactive control of unfair contract terms.91 It
remains to be seen whether the Department of Trade and Industry will keep
their promise to the Portfolio Committee that a grey list be introduced by
way of regulation.
Ideally, the grey list should be included in the text of the legislation, if need
be in a schedule. It would then have greater legitimacy and also be more
prominent and accessible, particularly to lay readers of the Act, such as
consumer advisers or journalists who are not lawyers. The argument that that
would necessitate frequent amendments to the legislation as new unfair terms
crop up does not hold water. The grey list of the EC Unfair Terms Directive
of 1993 has withstood the test of time.92 The English and Scottish Law
Commissions recommended only superficial changes to the Directive’s List
for their Unfair Contract Terms Bill of 2005.93 The European Commission’s
Proposal for a new maximum harmonization Directive on consumer rights
make some, but not extensive alterations to the EC Unfair Terms Directive’s
grey list, although it places five of the original items in the grey list in a
blacklist. In addition, stricter lists in the legislation of other European
countries like Germany and the Netherlands have remained unchanged for
89 Napier v Barkhuizen supra note 88 para 10. Cf Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
2002 (6) SA21 (SCA) para 9.
90 For a full consideration of lists of prohibited and presumptively unfair clauses,
including international experience with the use thereof, see Naudé op cit note 83.
91 Paragraph 1 of the author’s submission to Parliament, available at www.pmg.
org.za/files/docs/080826proftjakiesub.doc (last accessed on 27 October 2008).
92 Set out in anAnnexure to the Directive.
93 Schedule 1 to their Unfair Contract Terms Bill.
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years. A properly drafted grey list, which takes into account all this
experience with the use of lists, need not be amended frequently at all.
In the interest of flexibility, the English and Scottish Law Commissions
propose that the grey list be placed in a Schedule to the legislation and the
Minister given the power to add terms by regulation, should this prove
necessary.94 The European Commission’s draft Directive on Consumer
Rights also sets out the black and grey lists in Annexures to the Directive and
provides that the Commission may amend these Annexures in the light of
notification by the Member States of terms found unfair by competent
national authorities and which the Member States deem to be relevant for the
purpose of amending the Annexures.95 Similarly, the last item in the list of
‘examples of unfair terms’ in the proposed new Australian legislation refers to
‘a term of a kind, or a term that has an effect of a kind, prescribed by the
regulations’. It may be argued that a similar intermediate solution is
impossible in South Africa in view of the decision in Executive Council of the
Western Cape Legislature & others v President of the Republic of South Africa &
others,96 which held that Parliament may not in anAct authorize the President
or a Minister to amend the Act itself. It is submitted that the Australian
wording does not authorize the Minister to amend the Act itself, but merely
expressly incorporates terms prescribed by regulations into the grey list as
well.
In any event, if a grey list is included in the Regulations, the Regulations
should state clearly and in no uncertain terms that other, unlisted terms may
still be unfair under s 48; in other words, that the grey list is not intended to
be exhaustive.
However, in respect of the business-to-business contracts covered in the
Act,97 the black and grey lists should not apply to anything more than a term
that was originally put forward as one of the supplier’s written standard terms
of business and that has not subsequently been changed in favour of the small
business. This is the position under the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed
by the Law Commissions of England, Wales and Scotland.98 In fact, in
business-to-small business transactions, control merely on the basis of
unfairness should always be restricted to such standard terms.99 Common-
law and constitutional control mechanisms are sufficient to deal with core
terms and other negotiated terms in business-to-small business contracts.
It is submitted that even if no grey list is forthcoming, courts should have
regard to the black and grey lists in foreign unfair contract terms legislation in
94 Op cit note 31.
95 Article 39.
96 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC).
97 See s 5 read with the definition of ‘consumer’ in s 1.
98 S 14(6) read with s 11.
99 Cf English and Scottish Law Commissions Report op cit note 31 at 83 et seq.
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interpreting the concept of unfairness.100 It should be relevant for courts,
consumers and enforcement bodies to know which types of terms have
commonly been held to be so unfair that legislatures in a number of countries
were prepared to brand them as always or usually unfair.101
Three of the items in the current blacklist of s 51 deserve further
comment. Section 51(1)(g)(i) merely prohibits a false acknowledgment by
the consumer that ‘before the contract was made, no representations or
warranties were made in connection with the agreement by the supplier or a
person on behalf of the supplier.’ The more widely formulated item in the
EC Directive’s grey list, which refers to ‘terms with the object or effect of
limiting the business’s liability for statements or promises made by its
employees or agents, or making its liability for statements or promises subject
to formalities’, is preferable as it is better able to catch all sorts of terms aimed
at achieving the same effect.102 This type of term should also rather be
greylisted than prohibited outright in s 51, particularly as s 51 currently
applies to negotiated terms in the business-to-business contracts covered by
the Act (in particular where the ‘consumer’ is a small business or a franchisee).
The current wording prevents two businesses from explicitly and expressly
negotiating that a term be included that their written agreement will be the
sole record of their transaction and that no party would be able to rely on
alleged representations or warranties not recorded in the written agreement.
Secondly, the decision to prohibit exemption clauses in respect of gross
negligence103 is dangerous unless exemption clauses in respect of ordinary
negligence are greylisted. The legislation in its current format may be
interpreted as effectively sanctioning clauses that exempt liability for ordinary
negligence, particularly where these are initialed or signed, whereas these are
often unfair as well.104 The burden of persuading the court that there are
good reasons why the consumer should carry the risk of any harm caused by
the supplier’s negligence, should be on the business, which is what greylisting
such clauses would achieve. Greylisting such clauses would also make it more
likely that businesses would carefully consider whether it is really justifiable
in their business environment to exclude liability for negligence, as opposed
to, say, merely placing a reasonable cap on liability or to providing the
consumer with a choice to contract at a higher price without the exemption
clause.
However, it must be said that clauses exempting liability for ordinary
negligence are not necessarily greylisted in all foreign jurisdictions with
100 As noted above, s 2(2)(a) authorizes courts to consider relevant foreign and
international law when interpreting and applying theAct. See Naudé op cit note 83 at
147-64 for a discussion of the contents of lists from other countries.
101 Naudé op cit note 83 at 129.
102 Naudé op cit note 83 at 160-1.
103 Section 51(1)(c)(i).
104 See also the discussion of s 49 above.
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unfair terms legislation.105 They are greylisted in, for example, the Nether-
lands and Portugal, whereas the UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977,
subjects clauses excluding or limiting liability to a reasonableness standard,106
and explicitly provides that ‘it is for those claiming that a contract term or
notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness to show that it does.’ In
addition, clauses excluding or limiting liability for breach of contract (which
would often encompass contract terms limiting the supplier’s liability for
negligence) are greylisted in the European Unfair Terms Directive as well as
in a developing country like Thailand.107 However, in Germany only clauses
excluding or limiting the supplier’s liability for personal injury or death
and/or for gross negligence are blacklisted, whereas other exemption clauses
in respect of negligence are only subject to the general prohibition against
unfair contract terms.108
Whereas research on the practical impact of greylisting all exemption
clauses in respect of negligence would have been very helpful to inform the
decision of whether to take this course, at the very least clauses excluding or
limiting the supplier’s liability for bodily injury or death caused by the
supplier’s negligence should be greylisted.109
Finally, s 51(1)(h) on forfeiture clauses may be ambiguous in that it refers
to a requirement to forfeit any money to the supplier to which the supplier is
not entitled in terms of this Act or any other law. This may mean that no
forfeiture clause except in respect of forfeiture that is specifically allowed by a
law is allowed. Alternatively, it could merely mean that clauses in respect of
forfeiture prohibited by the Act or other laws are prohibited.
Section 52: ‘Powers of court to ensure fair and just conduct, terms and conditions’
Although situated in Part G on the consumer’s right to fair contract terms,
s 52 applies not only to unfair contract terms, but also to contraventions of
s 40 on ‘unconscionable conduct’ and s 41 on misrepresentations (both of
105 For a fuller discussion see Naudé op cit note 83 at 155-8.
106 Section 2(2).
107 In addition, the UK’s Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, which predates the
Directive, subjects exemption clauses in respect of negligence to a reasonableness
review.
108 This would be explained by the fact that Germany’s ‘grey list’ does not function
like most grey lists which allow for the possibility of a listed item being fair in the
particular circumstances of the case. The clauses in the German ‘grey list’ of § 308 are
all prohibited, but the list is called ‘grey’ as each item therein contains a particular
‘open’ or ‘evaluative’ element in the definition of the listed term itself, such as ‘an
unreasonably long period’, ‘an objectively justified reason’ or ‘a declaration. . .of
particular importance’. There are no items without such open-ended standards in the
German grey list. See further Naudé op cit note 83 at 130.
109 For full argument see Naudé op cit note 83 at 156-7. Such clauses are prohibited
in s 2(1) Unfair Contract Terms Act (UK); § 309(7)(a) BGB (German Civil Code);
§ 6(1)(a) Austrian Consumer Protection Act (Konsumentenschutzgesetz); art 18(a) of
the Portuguese legislation; and greylisted in item (a) Directive (injury or death caused
by an act or omission of the supplier).
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which appear in Part F). This peculiar situation is a remnant of the first two
published drafts of the Bill, dating from before its introduction into
Parliament, in which these provisions were all set out in one Part under the
heading ‘Right to honest dealing and fair agreements’.110
Essentially, s 52 grants courts the power to declare agreements, in whole or
in part, unfair or unconscionable.111 A court may also make any further order
it considers just and reasonable, including, but not limited to, an order to
restore money or property to the consumer, to compensate the consumer for
losses or expenses and requiring the supplier to cease any practice or alter any
practice, form or document, to avoid repetition of the supplier’s conduct.112
However, all of these orders may only be made if the Act ‘does not
otherwise provide a remedy sufficient to correct the relevant prohibited
conduct, unfairness, injustice or unconscionability’.113 It is unclear whether
this means that the consumer must first approach the alternative dispute
resolution agents mentioned in the Act (such as the ombud in a particular
sector) or the provincial consumer courts before she may approach an
ordinary court. This conclusion seems to be borne out by s 69(1)(d), which
provides that the consumer may only approach a court with jurisdiction over
the matter, if all other remedies available to that person in terms of national
legislation have been exhausted. This paragraph in s 69 appears after the
reference to the consumer’s right to use the other possible dispute resolution
mechanisms of s 69(1)(a) to (c).
On the other hand, if this was the intention, it does not make sense for s 52
to grant only the ordinary courts powers to make orders on unfair terms, and
not to grant such powers to the provincial consumer courts as well.114 The
result would be that the consumer is sent from pillar to post by requiring her
to first approach the provincial consumer courts, whereas they will have no
power to decide a dispute, but will merely be able to encourage the voluntary
settlement of the dispute. The consumer dealing with an intractable supplier
must therefore first go through the motions of discussing the matter before a
provincial consumer court, only to have to refer the matter to the ordinary
courts thereafter in order to obtain any relief where the supplier refuses to
stop relying on the term.
That only the ordinary courts would have jurisdiction in respect of unfair
contract terms, is not stated unequivocally, but is implicit in the absence of
any reference to the National Consumer Tribunal or provincial consumer
110 See Chapter 2 Part F of the first published Draft Consumer Protection Bill,
General Notice 418 GG 28629 of 15 March 2006 and the Second Discussion
Draft dated 8 September 2006, available at http://www.dti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/




114 ‘[C]ourt’ is defined in s 1 as not including a consumer court.
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courts in s 52. It should be noted that ‘court’ is defined in s 1 as not including
a consumer court.
In their initial briefing to Parliament on the Consumer Protection Bill, the
Department of Trade and Industry (‘the DTI’) explained that the Bill gives
exclusive jurisdiction to the courts over ‘contractual disputes’ due to a
compromise reached with the Department of Justice, which was concerned
that the courts’ jurisdiction was eroded by the creation of various tribunals.115
The minutes of this briefing, although not reflecting what was said orally on
the compromise with the Department of Justice, state that
‘[i]t was decided that the National Consumer Tribunal would be able to deal
with most consumer issues, but would refer contractual disputes to the courts. The
problem was however that courts were difficult for consumers to access. Thus
the Tribunal had the power to order compensation for the consumer. Where
the consumer approached the Ombudsman, the latter could enter a consent
order, which can be taken to the Tribunal or court to be entered as an order
(which could include damages). This shortened the process considerably, since
a Tribunal order enjoyed the same status as an order of the court.’
Although this is not entirely clear, the implication of the italicized words
seems to be that the DTI intended that consumers may either directly
approach the court for a declaration that a term is unfair, or may approach the
relevant ombud (if there is one for that sector), who could then enter a
consent order, which could be taken to court or the Tribunal to be made an
order of court. If such consensus was reached and reflected in a consent
order, there would therefore not be a dispute which had to be decided by an
ordinary court. However, the Tribunal and consumer courts would not have
jurisdiction over contractual disputes; otherwise s 52 would have bestowed
powers on these institutions as well.116
Whereas the existence of the small claims courts would provide some
relief to consumers who cannot afford litigation in the Magistrates’ or High
Courts, many cases would fall outside the jurisdiction of these courts. It is a
well known fact that the costs, risks and effort of court action are just too high
for ordinary consumers, including middle class consumers. For this and other
reasons set out below it is therefore unlikely that this legislation in its current
form will have a real impact on the eradication of unfair contract terms.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that s 52 is written only with the
paradigm of court action involving an individual agreement with a particular
individual consumer in mind. Thus subsecs (1) and (3) only bestow power on
courts in respect of ‘a transaction or agreement between a supplier and
115 Minutes of this briefing are available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20080507-
consumer-protection-bill-workshop-day-2 (last accessed on 10 March 2009).
116 The uncertainty caused by the failure to mention the Tribunal and consumer
courts in s 52 was pointed out in submissions to Parliament, but this was not specifi-
cally responded to by either the DTI or the parliamentary portfolio committee,
perhaps because an explanation was already given upon earlier introduction of the
Bill that only the ordinary courts should have jurisdiction over contractual issues as a
result of a compromise with the Department of Justice.
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consumer’. Subsection (2) sets out a list of factors relevant to the assessment
of fairness, but all of these refer to the agreement that was concluded and is
considered by the court. This exclusive paradigm of judicial control over
individual consumer agreements is highly problematic in the consumer
context, given the inherent limitations of court action. These have been fully
set out before117 and do not only relate to the cost, risk and effort of court
action for individual consumers. Ignorance of the law would also deter many
consumers, particularly vulnerable consumers, from bringing cases to court
or other bodies. Businesses faced with a challenge by an individual ‘difficult’
consumer may prefer to settle the matter out of court with that individual by
ceasing to rely on the term, whilst continuing to use it in all other
transactions. Court decisions also only bind the individual business con-
cerned and the message that a particular term has been declared unfair may
never reach other businesses or even their legal advisers, particularly as many
consumer cases would be heard in the lower courts, whose decisions are not
reported. Judicial control over agreements concluded in the past is also only
reactive, and always comes too late, after the abuse had already taken place.118
Fast, proactive control is more desirable and is unlikely to occur through
court action over an individual transaction for the abovementioned reasons.
It may be acceptable to grant courts the exclusive, final say over whether a
particular term is unfair, provided that other mechanisms aimed at preventa-
tive control which aim to address the limitations of reactive judicial control
are fully utilized. Such mechanisms include black and grey lists and gearing
the provisions on unfair terms towards the paradigm of ‘abstract’ ‘general use
challenges’ as well. ‘General use’ court challenges refer to interdict proceed-
ings brought by regulators such as the National Consumer Commission
(‘NCC’) or accredited consumer organizations in respect of terms drawn up
for general use. No transaction actually concluded with an individual
consumer is involved in such challenges, so that no individual consumer
need even give evidence on the terms ‘agreed’ with the supplier. Instead,
legislation should clearly authorize such bodies, and in the case of the NCC,
ideally oblige it, to consider complaints, negotiate undertakings with
businesses to stop using particular terms and institute interdict proceedings
against recalcitrant businesses which offer to contract on terms that are unfair,
unless there are good reasons not to. Section 52 should be amended to cater
for these types of challenges as well as individual challenges.
Experience in other countries has shown that only once such general use
challenges have been used has any success been achieved in the eradication of
unfair contract terms. For example, in the UK only the courts have the final
say about whether a term is unfair. However, under the legislation which
implemented the Unfair Terms Directive, the Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’)
117 Naudé op cit note 1 at 379–80 and authorities there cited.
118 For all these arguments, see Naudé op cit note 1 at 379-80 and authorities there
cited.
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is obliged to consider complaints unless they are frivolous or vexatious, and
may negotiate undertakings with businesses to stop using unfair terms, and
bring injunction proceedings against recalcitrant businesses.119 They have to
give reasons for any decision not to bring such injunction proceedings,
which in particular could include a voluntary undertaking by the business to
amend its terms.120 Although the Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 already
allowed for individual court challenges against certain unfair terms, the OFT,
when starting its work in the 1990s, found that many consumer contracts
contained unfair terms, even terms which were prohibited outright in the
1977 legislation.121 It was only once the OFT commenced its system of
negotiations against the backdrop of general use challenges in the form of
injunction proceedings that any real progress was made in the fight against
unfair terms.122 In Germany, it is the abstract challenges by consumer
organizations which have played the greatest role in the eradication of unfair
terms in consumer contracts.123 These challenges are sufficiently funded by
the German government.124
It is true that our Consumer Protection Act gives the NCC wide, general
powers elsewhere in the Act.125 These powers are wide enough to allow it to
bring such general use challenges, although it would seem that the intention
is that the NCC will first have to refer a complaint to the provincial and other
enforcement agencies.126 However, it would have been preferable to place
more specific obligations on the NCC to consider all complaints unless they
are frivolous or vexatious, negotiate undertakings with business to stop
prohibited conduct, keep a record of all such undertakings and provide
119 Regulations 10 and 12, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations,
1999.
120 Regulation 10, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999.
121 OFT Bulletin 2 page 5. See also Robert Bradgate ‘Experience in the UK’ in
European Commission The ‘Unfair Terms’ Directive, Five Years on: Evaluation and Future
Perspectives, Brussels Conference 1-3.7.1999 (1999) 35 at 50; Standing Committee of
Officials on Consumer Affairs — Unfair Contract Terms Working Party Unfair Con-
tract Terms — A Discussion Paper (2004) 44.
122 See Bradgate in European Commission Brussels Conference ibid at 35 for statistics
up to the end of 1998. See generally, Susan Bright ‘Winning the battle against unfair
contract terms’2000 (20) Legal Studies 331.
123 See Hans-W Micklitz ‘Report on the practical implementation of Directive
93/13/EEC in the Federal Republic of Germany’ in European Commission Brussels
Conference ibid 221 at 222. They are given the power to bring injunction proceedings
under the Unterlassungsklagegesetz (§§ 1-3). See also the Background Report to the
OECD Workshop on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the Global
Marketplace of 19-25 April 2005 at page 30 available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
59/21/34699496.pdf (last accessed 18 February 2009).
124 Micklitz op cit note 123 at 222. Similarly, Jaffe & Vaughn op cit note 59 report
that ‘[t]he Venezuelan state provides a mechanism by which an agency representing
consumers can examine and challenge contracts of adhesion. This provision for some
oversight of these contracts seems to be a useful enforcement technique’ (at 9).
125 Chapters 3, 5 and 6.
126 Section 72 et seq.
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consumers with extracts from this register on request about the status of a
particular term, and if the business fails to agree to or comply with such
undertaking, bring general use challenges, unless there are good reasons not
to. Ideally, separate unfair terms legislation, which provides specifically for
these powers and other detailed rules to ensure more effective control,
should have been passed. In any event, now that the rules on unfair contract
terms form part of the Consumer Protection Act, s 52 should be rewritten
with such challenges in mind.
As already stated, the list of relevant factors in s 52(2) which a court ‘must’
consider is also problematic for being written only with the paradigm of a
complaint by a particular, individual consumer over terms already included
in his agreement in mind. The list of factors is deficient even for that
paradigm. Almost all the factors relate to ‘procedural unfairness’ whereas
more factors relevant to the ‘substantive fairness’ of a term should also have
been included.127 With ‘procedural unfairness factors’ I mean factors relating
to the process under which an individual agreement was concluded and the
peculiar attributes of the individual consumer involved, such as the indi-
vidual consumer’s bargaining position and sophistication, and whether she
knew about the term. As I have shown in detail elsewhere, even sophisticated
consumers operating in a competitive market, who therefore have ‘bargain-
ing power’ if this is understood in the economic sense, need protection
against substantively unfair terms, regardless of whether they somehow
sensed that they should really be reading the standard terms before adhering
to the contract but did not do so.128 The reality is that consumers, regardless
of their sophistication or the theoretical possibility of obtaining better
standard terms in the marketplace, will mostly not read long lists of standard
terms every time they enter into a transaction.129 As Reinhard Zimmermann
has noted, the most prudent decision for the reasonable person will often be
not to read the standard terms, even if he or she has the ‘bargaining power’ to
have them renegotiated.130 As noted above, the transaction costs of reading
the terms, trying to understand what they mean and finding someone with
authority to bargain about them, are just too high, regardless of the economic
‘bargaining position’ of the parties, taking into account the availability of
equivalent goods or services on better standard terms.131 All consumers
confronted with standard terms deserve protection against substantively
unfair terms, as the use of long lists of standard terms and the typical
take-it-or-leave-it attitude of suppliers create an inherent, structural inequal-
ity between the business and the consumer. Suppliers typically abuse the
consumer’s lack of time, knowledge or bargaining power by tucking away
unfair terms in the standard terms. For this reason, mere substantive
127 See also Naudé op cit note 1 in respect of an earlier set of factors in the draft Bills.
128 Naudé op cit note 1 at 365-9.
129 Naudé op cit note 1 at 365-9.
130 Reinhard Zimmermann The New German Law of Obligations (2005) 176.
131 See at note 18 above.
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unfairness of the term, regardless of the particular consumer’s bargaining
power etc, should sometimes be sufficient. A court which is not sufficiently
aware of the realities surrounding standard-form contracting, upon seeing
the prominence given to bargaining power and alternatives in the market-
place in s 52, may consider the consumer’s sophistication or the availability of
alternatives in the marketplace as unduly important in counting against the
consumer. In addition, in general use challenges, the focus is likely to be
more on substantive fairness, given that no individual consumer is involved
in the litigation. More factors to do with substantive fairness should therefore
have been included in the list. In addition, ‘must’ should be changed to ‘may’
to give the court the discretion to discuss only the factors which it considers
relevant. It should also be made clear that the list of factors in s 52(2) is not a
closed one, so that other factors may be relevant.
The best international model of relevant factors is to be found in the
Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the English and Scottish Law
Commissions in 2005.132 Some of the substantive fairness factors in the Bill
are ‘(c) the balance of the parties’ interests, (d) the risks to the party adversely
affected by the term, (e) the possibility and probability of insurance’ and ‘(g)
the extent to which the term (whether alone or with others) differs from
what would have been the case in its absence.’ In addition, the Explanatory
Notes to the Bill heavily qualify the procedural factors of bargaining position
and knowledge of the consumer in a manner that will invite sensitivity to the
realities surrounding standard-term contracting.133 Thus, after having spe-
cifically warned that ‘inequality of bargaining power’ is an ambiguous term
which is often misunderstood, the Notes explain that:
‘the strength of the parties’ bargaining positions may involve questions such as
(a) whether the transaction was unusual for either or both of them, (b) whether
the complaining party was offered a choice over a particular term, (c) whether
that party had a reasonable opportunity to seek a more favourable term, (d)
whether that party had a realistic opportunity to enter into a similar contract
with other persons, but without that term, (e) whether that party’s require-
ments could have been met in other ways, (f) whether it was reasonable, given
that party’s abilities, for him or her to have taken advantage of any choice
offered under (b) or available under (e)’.134
In considering the ‘knowledge and understanding of a party’ it may be
relevant:
‘(c) whether the party understood [the term’s] meaning and implications, (d)
what a person other than the party, but in a similar position, would usually
expect in the case of a similar transaction, (e) the complexity of the transaction,
(f) the information given to the party about the transaction before or when the
contract was made, (g) whether the contract was transparent, (h) how the
contract was explained to the party, (i) whether the party had a reasonable
132 Op cit note 31 s 14(4).
133 Paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill, op cit note 31.
134 Ibid.
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opportunity to absorb any information given, (j) whether the party took
professional advice or it was reasonable to expect the party to have done so, and
(k) whether the party had a realistic opportunity to cancel the contract without
charge.’135
As already pointed out elsewhere, the South African Law Commission (as
it then was) also included factors to do with substantive fairness in its Bill,136
and it is a pity that all the good parts of its proposed Bill have not been
replicated in the Consumer Protection Act.137 Such factors include:
‘(m) whether a term is unduly difficult to fulfil, or imposes obligations or
liabilities on a party which are not reasonably necessary to protect the other
party; (n) whether the contract or term excludes or limits the obligations or
liabilities of a party to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to protect his or
her interests; (o) whether there is a lack of reciprocity in an otherwise reciprocal
contract; . . . (w) whether, to the prejudice of the party against whom the term
is proffered, the party proffering the term is otherwise placed in a position
substantially better than that in which the party proffering the term would have
been under the regulatory law, had it not been for the term in question; [and]
(x) the degree to which the contract requires a party to waive rights to which he
or she would otherwise be entitled’.138
In any event, even if the wording of s 52(2) is not changed in the manner
suggested, courts should consider the aforementioned substantive fairness
factors and qualifications placed on the procedural fairness factors, and refuse
to be bound to consider only the factors currently listed in the Act.
V SCOPE OF THE CONTENT CONTROL PROVIDED FOR IN
THE ACT
All terms in all the agreements covered by the Act are subject to review for
unfairness. This means that specifically negotiated terms, including core
terms relating to the contract price or definition of the main subject matter,
may also be challenged under the Act. This applies not only to contracts with
individual consumers who are natural persons acting for purposes wholly or
partially unrelated to their business or profession (what I would call ‘true
B2C contracts’). It applies also to the B2B contracts covered by the Act.
These are, first, agreements for the supply of goods and services to small
juristic persons, defined with reference to a maximum turnover or asset value
to be prescribed by the Minister, or to any business which is a non-juristic
person.139 (Partnerships, trusts and bodies corporate are regarded as juristic
135 Ibid.
136 Naudé op cit note 1 at 374.
137 In particular, the powers and duties of the Ombudsperson provided for in the
Bill, which are well-geared towards preventative control.
138 The argument that more factors to do with substantive fairness should have been
included was also made to Parliament but not acted upon. See Naudé op cit note 22 at
4-5.
139 Section 5(2).
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persons for the purpose of the Act.)140 It is possible that the Minister will set
the maximum turnover or asset value at one million rand as under the
National Credit Act.141 In addition, all terms in all franchise agreements may
be challenged by the franchisee for their unfairness, regardless of the size of
the franchisee.142
In its original form as initially introduced into Parliament, the Bill
differentiated between the price, which could only be set aside if it was
manifestly unjust, and other terms, which could be set aside simply because
they were unfair, unreasonable or unjust.143 This distinction was removed in
the final version.
By contrast to the position in the Consumer Protection Act, other
jurisdictions often limit content control in respect of B2B contracts to
standard terms.144 Examples are the German, Dutch and Portuguese legisla-
tion.145 One exception is the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, but only
certain types of negotiated clauses are subject to control on the basis of
unreasonableness alone.146 The countries which copied the EC Unfair Terms
Directive limit protection in B2C contracts to non-negotiated, non-core
terms which are not, moreover, identical to the residual rules which would
apply in the absence of agreement on a matter.147 ‘Non-negotiated term’ is a
wider concept than ‘standard term’ as the term does not have to be intended
for general and repeated use, as long as it was drafted in advance and the
consumer has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the
term.148 The typical exclusion of core terms from review means that terms as
to the price and definition of the main subject matter of the contract are
140 See the definition of ‘juristic person’ in s 1.
141 Section 7(1)(a) of Act 34 of 2005 read with item 2 in the Schedule to General
Notice 713 GG 28893 of 1 June 2006.
142 Section 5(6) and (7).
143 Consumer Protection Bill 19 of 2008.
144 This is what the Law Commissions of England, Wales and Scotland have recom-
mended for small business contracts, whereas in B2C contracts all terms except trans-
parent core terms are subject to review.
145 §§ 305-310 BGB (German Civil Code), arts 6:231-237 BW (Dutch Civil
Code); the Portuguese Decree-Law No 446/85 of 25 October 1985 on unfair con-
tract terms, as amended by Decree-Law No 220/95 of 31 January 1995.
146 So, for example, any clause limiting liability for death or personal injury caused
by negligence is prohibited, and all other exemption clauses relating to negligence
must be fair and reasonable (s 2). Exemption clauses relating to breach of contract are
only subject to review if they form part of standard business terms, or the other party
deals as a consumer (s 3). However, when a company purchases goods of a type in
which it does not ordinarily deal and which are not for a purpose integral to the
business, it may ‘deal as a consumer’ under the Unfair Contract Terms Act (see for
example R & B Customs Brokers Ltd v United Dominions Trust Ltd [1988] 1All ER 847).
147 So, for example, apart from the limited category of negotiated terms covered by
the UK Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, only non-negotiated, non-core terms are
subject to review under the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations,
1999, which largely copied the EC Unfair Terms Directive.
148 See, for example, the definition in art 3(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL532
JOBNAME: SALJ 09 Part 3 PAGE: 29 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 25 09:31:06 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2009−Part3/04article
excluded from review, provided they are ‘transparent’, that is, expressed in
clear and intelligible language. This is, for example, the position under the
Unfair Terms Directive (implemented almost unchanged in the UK),149 the
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the European Draft
Common Frame of Reference, all of which apply only to non-negotiated
terms.150 The English and Scottish Law Commissions wisely place further
qualifications on the exclusion of core terms from review, namely that the
definition of the main subject matter must be substantially the same as the
definition the consumer reasonably expected, and the price must be payable
in circumstances substantially the same as those the consumer expected and
calculated in a way substantially the same as the consumer reasonably
expected.151
It is to be hoped that courts applying the more generous provisions of the
South African legislation will intuitively take into account the difference
between negotiated, non-negotiated and core terms when considering the
fairness of a term. Hopefully they will not easily pronounce on the adequacy
of the price, at least not unless it is manifestly unjust or there is ‘gross
disparity’.152 Similarly, the definition of the main subject matter of the
contract should normally be left untouched, provided it complies with the
above-mentioned qualifications set by the Law Commissions in the UK. The
consumer definitely knows about the core terms and could be expected to
shop around for better core terms or otherwise bargain about them. It would
also create uncertainty if courts are willing to set aside a contract simply on
the basis that the price exceeds what is ultimately found to be the market
value and is therefore ‘unfair’.
In my view core terms should rather have been explicitly excluded from
review on the basis of their fairness, provided the aforesaid qualifications are
149 See note 146 above.
150 Article 3, EC Unfair Terms Directive (op cit note 32); art 4:110 PECL, art II —
1:110 DCFR. See generally on PECL and its status, Ole Lando & Hugh Beale (eds)
Principles of European Contract Law — Parts I and II Combined and Revised Edition
(2000) xxi-xxvii and on the Draft Common Frame of Reference Study Group on a
European Civil Code & Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group) Prin-
ciples, Definitions and Model Rules on European Private Law — Draft Common Frame of
Reference — Outline Edition (2009) 1-5.
151 Section 4(2) and (3).
152 The concept of a ‘manifestly unjust price’ is found in the common-law rule that
a court may set aside a price set by a third party appointed by the parties for that
purpose as long as it was manifestly unjust. See, for example, Hurwitz & others NNO v
Table Bay Engineering (Pty) Ltd & another 1994 (3) SA 449 (C); Van Heerden v Basson
1998 (1) SA 715 (T). The reasoning in the latter case shows that this situation is
distinguishable from one where the parties specifically agreed on the manifestly
unjust price, as the court suggested that the reason why the third party’s price might
be challenged is the absence of consensus or reasonable reliance of consensus that a
manifestly unjust price set by the third party would bind them (at 718I — 719B). On
the concept of ‘gross disparity’ see for example, art 3.10 of the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, 2004.
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met. Of course, the stricter common-law and constitutional control mecha-
nisms153 and s 40 of the Act on unconscionability would still provide control
over unjust core terms.
Certainly terms which merely reflect what the law would have been in
their absence should not be set aside merely because the court considers them
‘unfair’. Rather, the normal route for developing the common-law residual
rule (or ‘term implied by law’) must be followed if the court considers it
unfair. Again, ideally international best practice of explicitly excluding such
terms from review on the basis of unfairness should have been followed.154
In addition, courts should be wary of upholding challenges to any
negotiated terms in B2B contracts merely on the basis that they are ‘unfair’.
The legislation should have provided for differentiation between the B2B
and B2C contracts covered by the Act. In respect of the B2B contracts
covered by the Act, only standard terms should have been subject to
challenge simply on the basis that they are unfair. In this regard theAct should
have allowed challenge to a term that was originally put forward as one of the
supplier’s written standard terms of business and that has not subsequently
been changed in favour of the small business.155 This would allow the small
business to challenge a particular standard term which was not negotiated,
even if some of the other standard terms were negotiated. The stricter
common-law control mechanisms such as the requirement that contracts
must not be contrary to public policy are sufficient for the negotiated terms
in business-to-business contracts.156 The Act does not purport to have
codified all of these common-law rules.
Finally, it should be noted that Part G of the Consumer Protection Act
does not apply to contracts concluded before the general effective date.157
153 Such as the requirement of legality, and the rules on undue influence and mis-
representation.
154 See, for example, § 307(3) of the German Civil Code; s 4(4)(b) of the English
and Scottish Law Commissions’Bill.
155 This is the position under the Unfair Contract Terms Bill proposed by the Law
Commissions of England, Wales and Scotland. See s 14(6) read with s 11.
156 The Law Commissions of England, Wales and Scotland aptly recommended
that in B2C contracts, all terms, including negotiated terms, are subject to a fairness
review. They considered that in B2C contracts, there is hardly ever any real negotia-
tion about terms except for core terms anyway. The Office of Fair Trading gave
evidence that firms were exploiting the fact that the Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contract Regulations, 1999 do not apply to individually negotiated terms. In addi-
tion, a consumer may not realize the implications of negotiating. They stated further
that the proposal would also make the legislation simpler, while affecting very few
cases where non-core terms are actually negotiated. The fact that a term was
explained to the consumer or that the consumer took advice on it, would of course be
relevant to whether or not the term is unfair (op cit note 31 at 30-1). Their reasons for
providing for more limited control in business-to-small business contracts (defined
with reference to employee numbers) is set out at 86 et seq of their Report (op cit
note 31). A consideration of the delimitation of which businesses deserve statutory
protection against unfair standard terms is beyond the scope of this article.
157 Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2.
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VI OTHER PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THIS PART
OF THE ACT
Burden of proof in respect of unfairness
I have argued elsewhere that where an individual (‘true’) consumer is
involved in the litigation, the burden of proving the fairness of a term should
ideally be on the business once the issue is raised by the consumer or the
court on its own initiative, even if the particular term is not greylisted.158
This is what is proposed by the English and Scottish Law Commissions for
true consumer contracts, that is, contracts with an individual (natural person)
acting wholly or mainly for a purpose unconnected with her business or
profession.159 This would prevent the supposed danger that a grey list would
cause courts to limit control to the listed clauses (coupled with clear emphasis
in the legislation and explanatory memorandum that unlisted terms may also
be unfair).160 However, in general use challenges where no individual
consumer is involved, but a consumer organization, regulator or the NCC
applies for an interdict to stop a supplier from using a term in future, or where
a compliance notice by the NCC in this regard is challenged by a supplier,
the burden of proof in respect of unlisted clauses should remain on these
institutions.161 They are in a stronger position than individual consumers to
argue their case, will be familiar with the Act and will vigorously argue that
an unlisted clause may still be unfair under the general clause prohibiting
unfair terms. However, a greylisted term should always be rebuttably
presumed to be unfair, including in general use challenges.162
In all the B2B transactions covered by the Act the burden of proof should
remain on the complainant.163
However, it may be argued that it would be too drastic to place the risk of
non-persuasion on the business in cases involving individual consumers and
non-greylisted clauses. On this view, the burden of proof or risk of
non-persuasion should in these cases also depend on whether a term is
greylisted or not. This is the position in, for example, the Netherlands.164 On
reflection, a country with not much experience with unfair contract terms
158 Naudé op cit note 83 at 142–4, who also sets out different views on this issue
encountered in other jurisdictions.
159 Section 16(1) of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’Bill.
160 See also Naudé op cit note 1 especially at 361-70 for the argument that typically
the standard terms of a consumer contract cannot be regarded as the product of the
autonomy of the consumer. Other policy reasons demand that businesses are allowed
to organize themselves by way of standard contract terms. As argued there, some
commentators therefore argue that the burden should be on the business to prove that
a term should be enforced in so far as it conflicts with the residual rules of contract law
which would have applied in its absence.
161 See also s 16(2) of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’Bill.
162 Naudé op cit note 83 at 142-4, contrary to what is proposed by the English and
Scottish Law Commissions.
163 See also s 17 of the English and Scottish Law Commissions’Bill.
164 Article 6:237 Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code).
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control, like South Africa, might justifiably follow this more cautious option
than always placing the risk of non-persuasion on the business in cases
involving individual consumers.
Power of court to raise issue of unfairness of its own initiative
It is likely that South African courts would be prepared to raise the issue of
the unfairness of a term on their own initiative, given the well-established
principle that courts may decide issues overlooked by the parties where this is
required in the interest of justice.165 Nevertheless, it may be advisable to
include an explicit provision in the Act that courts (or the Tribunal or
provincial consumer courts if they should be given jurisdiction) may raise the
issue of unfairness on their own initiative. This issue was disputed in the
European Court of Justice in view of the silence of the EC Unfair Terms
Directive on the matter. Although, not surprisingly, the Court held that
national courts may raise the issue of unfairness on their own initiative, the
expensive litigation could have been avoided if there was an explicit
provision on this point.166
VII CONCLUSION
Whereas the DTI and Parliament should be commended for introducing
unfair contract terms legislation at last, more cognizance should have been
taken of international best practice in this area in drafting this legislation. The
problems faced by consumers which necessitate legislative protection could
have been far better addressed through a number of strategies employed
elsewhere. The DTI and Parliament are therefore urged to make the
amendments to the Consumer Protection Act proposed in this contribution
on the basis of comparative research. Courts are also urged to follow the
recommendations made in this article for the interpretation of the provisions.
165 See recently Southern Africa Enterprise Development Fund Inc v Industrial Credit
Corporation Africa Ltd 2008 (6) SA468 (W).
166 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero; Salvat Editores SA v José M.
Sánchez Alcón Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo, Mohammed Berroane and Emilio Viñas
Feliú, ECJ judgment of 27/6/2000, Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, [2000]
ECR I-4941.
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